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DAVID BUNNING*

IRS Third-Party Recordkeeper
Summonses Issued at the Request
of a Treaty Partner: A Practical
and Theoretical Approach**
When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) needs information concerning
matters affecting domestic taxation, it may issue an administrative summons to the taxpayer, or to a custodian of records of the taxpayer, requiring appearance before the IRS to testify and produce records. When
a foreign country needs information in the possession of an entity in the
United States, it may, pursuant to the applicable treaty, request the IRS
to use its summons power to compel the testimony and documents needed.
This article discusses the law concerning the enforcement of IRS summonses issued to third-party recordkeepers at the request of a foreign
state. It looks first at the general framework of exchange of information
provisions in tax treaties. The second portion examines the procedure for
the issuance of an IRS administrative summons to a custodian of the
taxpayer's records, and the judicial procedures for the challenge and
enforcement of the summons. Finally, this article examines the peculiar
procedural and substantive grounds for the enforcemept or quashing of
a third-party recordkeeper summons issued at the request of a foreign
state pursuant to a treaty with the United States. The purpose of this

*J. D.. McGeorge School of Law, 1982. The author is a trial attorney with the Tax Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice. He represented the United States in Alliance Acceptance
9414 (D. Haw. 1987). The views
Corp. v. United States, 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas, (CCH)
expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of
the Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, or any other agency of the United
States.
**The Editorial Reviewer for this article is Kevin M. Harris.
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article is to provide a summary of the current state of the law and a stepby-step primer for the practitioner.
I. Tax Treaties: An Overview
The United States has tax treaties currently in force with thirty-five nations: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta,
Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the People's
Republic of China, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland,
Trinidad and Tobago, the USSR, and the United Kingdom.' In addition,
2
twelve other treaties have been negotiated, but are not currently in force.
The purpose of these treaties is twofold: to prevent multiple taxation
of the same activity, and to provide states with a means of information
exchange to prevent evasion of domestic taxes through international transactions. Such cooperation is necessary because a state's authority to
compel production of information usually ends at its borders: to obtain
3
information outside its jurisdiction requires the cooperation of other states.
4
Each of these treaties, with the exception of that with the Soviet Union,
contains language governing the exchange of information. These provisions stipulate that if a treaty partner makes a specific request of the
United States, the IRS is either obligated or given the authority at its
5
discretion to obtain information.

I. The texts of these treaties are reprinted in [1987] Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H).
2. Tax treaties have been negotiated but are not yet in force between the United States
and the nations of Argentina, Aruba, Bangladesh, Bermuda, Brazil, the British Virgin Islands, Israel, the Netherlands Antilles, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Tunisia. Certain provisions
of the Dutch Income Tax Treaty, infra note 6, apply to Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles.
See generally Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H). The status of tax treaties is ever changing. For
example, in July 1983, the United States terminated its tax treaties with, inter alia, the wellknown tax havens of Anguilla, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevin, St. Lucia, and the Grenadines. Roughly contemporaneously with this, the

nations of Antigua and'Aruba cancelled their tax conventions with the United States. Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20 INT'L LAW. 1209,
1213 (1986). The tax treaty between the United States and the Union of South Africa has

recently been terminated. 3 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1 87,003.
3. In certain circumstances a state may order a party subject to its jurisdiction to perform
an act in a foreign country. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1Ilth Cir.
1982); United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Toyota

Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569
F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983); see generally Almand, Expanding IRS Access to ForeignBased Documentation and Information in U.S. Tax Audits and Litigation, 64 TAXEs 890
(1986); Crinion, supra note 2.

4. Convention on Matters of Taxation, June 20, 1973, United States-Soviet Union, 27
U.S.T. I, T.I.A.S. No. 8225, reprinted in 3 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H)

86,101.

5. The circumstances under which compliance with the request is mandatory or discretionary are discussed infra notes 100-62 and accompanying text. In addition to specific
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The earliest treaties provided that the states shall exchange information
6
for specified purposes and set forth certain exceptions to that obligation.
The next stage of development saw a greater sophistication of language,
including specific requests for information, the obligation of the requested
7
state to provide information, and specific exceptions to that obligation.
The treaties negotiated thereafter retained these basic elements and supplemented them with certain refinements included to meet specific areas
8

of concern.
The reason for the similarity of tax treaty provisions is that the United
States negotiates such treaties from model treaties. The United States has
a model income tax treaty 9 and a model estate and gift tax treaty. 10 Ne-

gotiation of a treaty proceeds from the language of the model, and the
provisions in the respective model treaties are substantially the same.''
In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD)12 has promulgated draft treaties for taxes on income and capital 13

requests, tax treaties also provide for the exchange of information on a routine or discretionary basis. See Reiner, How IRS Exchanges Tax Information with Other Countries 31
TAX EXECUTIVE 305, 306 (1979); Seemann, Exchange of Information Under International
Tax Conventions, 17 INT'L LAW. 333, 336-38 (1983); Switzer, Exchange of linormation
Articles, 26 CAN. TAX J. 306, 307-9 (1978).

6. See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes, United States-Netherlands, Apr. 29,
1948, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855; 10 Bevans 225, 32 U.N.T.S. 167, amended, Dec.
30, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6051, 557 U.N.T.S. 295, reprinted in 3 Fed. Tax
Treaties, (P-H) 66,122, [hereinafter Dutch Income Tax Treaty].
7. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Income Taxation, United StatesAustralia, Aug. 6, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10773. reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties, (P-H) 15,032
[hereinafter the Australian Income Tax Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Income Taxation, United States-Norway, Dec. 3, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474,
amended, Sept. 19, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 10205, reprinted in 3 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 69,031
[hereinafter Norwegian Income Tax Treaty].
8. Various aspects of these exchange of information provisions are discussed infra notes
88-99 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. Draft Model Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981 reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties
(P-H) 111022 at 1085 [hereinafter U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty]. The provisions of article
26, governing the exchange of information, are substantially the same as the U.S. Draft
Model Income Tax Treaty of May 17, 1977. reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H)
1019,
at 1043.
10. U.S. Draft Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty of November 20, 1980, reprinted in I
Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1 1020, at 1067 [hereinafter U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty].
II. Compare article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty. supra note 9, with article
12 of the U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, supra note 10. Article 12 has no sections
corresponding to Sections (4) and (5) of article 26. In all other respects, however, they are
the same.
12. The OECD member states are the United States, Canada, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.
13. OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital (1977), reprinted
in I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1017, at 1025 Ihereinafter OECD Model Income Tax Treaty].
WINTER 1988
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and for estate and gift taxes. 14 The model U.S. treaties are based upon
5
the OECD models. '
The provisions of these model treaties governing the exchange of in6
formation are almost identical. They provide as follows:'
ARTICLE 26
(I) The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention
or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by
the Convention insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of information is not restricted by Article I (General
Scope). Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as
secret and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts
and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment, collection, or administration of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination
of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by the Convention. Such persons
or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may
disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.
(2) In no case shall the provisions of paragraph I be construed so as to impose
on a Contracting State the obligation
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State:
or
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial,
commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).
(3) If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this
Article, the other Contracting State shall obtain the information to which the
request relates in the same manner and to the same extent as if the tax of the
first-mentioned State were the tax of that other State and were being imposed
by that other State. If specifically requested by the competent authority of a
Contracting State, the competent authority of the other Contracting State shall
provide information under this Article in the form of depositions of witnesses
and authenticated copies of unedited original documents (including books, papers, statements, records, accounts, and writings), to the same extent such
depositions and documents can be obtained under the laws and administrative
practices of that other State with respect to its own taxes.

14. OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts
(182), reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1018, at 1037 [hereinafter OECD Model Estate
and Gift Tax Treaty].
15. Note, The IRS Stnmnons Power Under the Lowest Common Denominator Provisions o1
United States Double Taxation Treaties, 16GEo. WASH J. INT'L, L. & ECON. 143, 148(1981).

16. The text reproduced here is that of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note
9. The U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, .supra note 10, is the same, except the
pertinent provision in Article 12, paragraphs (4) and (5) are omitted, and paragraph (6) is
renumbered accordingly. Article 26 of the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, spra note 13,
is the same, but contains only the first two paragraphs. The same is true of Article 12 of
the OECD Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, supra note 14.
VOL. 22, NO. 4
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(4) Each of the Contracting States shall endeavor to collect on behalf of the
other Contracting State such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that relief
granted by the Convention from taxation imposed by that other State does not
inure to the benefit of persons not entitled thereto.
(5) Paragraph 4 of this Article shall not impose upon either of the Contracting
States the obligation to carry out administrative measures which are of a different nature from those used in the collection of its own taxes, or which would
be contrary to its sovereignty, security, or public purpose.
(6) For the purposes of this Article, the Convention shall apply, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2 (Taxes Covered), to taxes of every kind
imposed by a Contracting State.

The administrative summons is the chief vehicle through which the IRS
obtains information to honor a request for information under a treaty. To
provide an understanding of what the IRS may compel, the next section
discusses the summons power of the IRS, and particularly the third-party
recordkeeper summons.
II. The IRS Third-Party Recordkeeper Summons

Congress had granted the IRS broad power to compel production of
testimony and records of taxpayers' 7 and other persons who hold information that may relate to a taxpayer's tax liability. 18 The IRS may issue
an administrative summons in the furtherance of any of four purposes
outlined by statute. These are: (1) ascertaining the correctness of any tax
return; (2) making a return where none has been made; (3) determining
tax liability; or (4) collecting a tax liability. ' 9
In pursuit of these broad goals, the IRS may: (1) "examine any books,
20
papers, records, or other data which may be relevant to such inquiry";
(2) summon the taxpayer or his employee, or "any person having possession, custody, or care" of records relating to the business of the taxpayer "or any other person the Secretary may deem proper" to appear
before the Secretary at a time and place specified in the summons to
testify and produce records "as may be relevant or material to such
22
inquiry"; 2 1 and (3) take the taxpayer's testimony.

17. Throughout this article, the term "taxpayer"

will be used, perhaps euphemistically.

as a shorthand expression for the person whose tax liability is under investigation.
18. This broad grant of power is consistent with the statutory obligation to police the tax
system imposed on the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by Congress. 26 U.S.C. § 7601(a)
(1982) provides as follows:
The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable. cause officers or employees of the "reasury
Department to proceed. from time to time. through each internal revenue district and inquire after and
concerning all persons therein who may he liable to pay ny internal revenue tax. and all persons owning
or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 7602(a).
§ 7602(a)(1).
§ 7602(a)(2).
§ 7602(a)(3).
WINTER 1988
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To compel the required testimony and records, an IRS agent issues and
serves 23 a summons, 24 specifying "with reasonable certainty" any records to be produced, 25 upon the person to whom it is directed. The
summons customarily requires attendance before the issuing agent eleven
26
days from the date of service.
If the summons is issued to a third-party recordkeeper, certain additional
statutory requirements must be met. A third-party recordkeeper is defined
as any bank or savings and loan association, provider of credit through
credit cards, attorney, accountant, barter exchange, or any regulated investment company. 27 These statutory requirements are triggered, except
in certain specified cases, 28 if the summons "requires the production of
any portion of records made or kept of the business transactions or affairs,
of any person," 29 other than the summoned party. Where a summons is
served upon a third-party recordkeeper, notice of the summons must be
provided to the taxpayer within three days of the day on which such service
3
is made, but not later than twenty-three days before the appearance date. 0
The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the summons 3 1 and an ex32
planation of the right to bring a proceeding to quash the summons.
The taxpayer may file a petition to quash the summons in the U.S.
District Court. 33 Whether or not that course is taken, the United States
34
may file a proceeding to enforce the summons.
When the summoned party receives the summons, it must assemble
the records requested and be prepared to produce them on the day spec23. Service may be made by personal service or by leaving the summons at "the last and
usual
24.
25.
26.

place of abode." Id. § 7603 (Supp. IV 1986).
Id. § 7603.
Id.
Id. § 7605(a) requires only that the time and place fixed for attendance be "reasonable

under the circumstances." Production of books, records, or other documents requires ten
days' notice.
27. Id. § 7609(a)(3).
28. These statutory exceptions are where the summons is issued to the taxpayer, or issued
to determine whether the summoned party maintains records, or where the summons is a
John Doe summons. Id. § 7609(a)(4) (1982). The John Doe summons requirements are set
forth in id. § 7609(f) and apply where the IRS seeks the information regarding a taxpayer
whose name is not specified, such as the names of all taxpayers who made a particular
investment.
Further exceptions are contained in id. § 7609(c). The third-party recordkeeper provisions
do not apply if the summons is used solely to determine the identity of a person with a
numbered bank account, id. § 7609(c)(2)(A); or if the summons is issued in aid of collection
of a tax previously assessed or reduced to judgment, id. § 7609(c)(3).
29. Id. § 7609(a)(l)(B).
30. Id. § 7609(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 7609(a)(1) (1982).
Id. § 7609(b)(2)(A).
See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
26 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (1982).
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ified in the summons, 35 regardless of whether the taxpayer has filed a
petition to quash. Where appropriate, the IRS may issue a certificate to
the summoned party stating that the time for the filing of a petition to
quash has expired. 36 The summoned party is immune from suit for damupon such a certificate
ages for disclosure of records in good faith reliance
37
or an order of a court enforcing the summons.
III. Procedure for Quashing an IRS Summons

The procedure for quashing all IRS summonses, whether issued for
domestic or foreign tax liability, is the same. Upon receipt of the summons,
or of the copy of the summons delivered to the third-party recordkeeper,
the taxpayer may file a petition to quash the summons 38 in the U.S. District
39
Court for the district where the summoned party resides or is found.
The petition must be filed within twenty days after the notice of the
summons is given, 40 and a copy of the petition must be mailed by regparty 4 ' and "such office as the
istered or certified mail to the summoned
42
notice."
the
in
direct
Secretary may
Because these provisions constitute a waiver of the United States'

sovereign immunity, they must be strictly followed. If the petition is filed
late, it is fatally defective and will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.4 3 Similarly, if the notice to the taxpayer specifies that the
petition must be mailed to a particular IRS agent at a particular address,

35. Id. § 7609(i)(1).
36. Id. § 7609(i)(2).
37. Id. § 7609(i)(3).
38. Id. § 7609(b)(2) provides that the person entitled to notice of the summons under
§ 7609(a) shall "have the right to begin a proceeding to quash such summons ......
39. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(1) (1982). This court is the only court with jurisdiction over such
an action. Deal v. United States, 759 F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1985); Masat v. United States,
745 F.2d 985, 986-88 (5th Cir. 1984); Maikranz v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.
Ind. 1985).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A) (1982). If the notice is mailed, the twenty-day period begins
running on the date following the date the notice is mailed, not the date it is received.
Williams v. IRS, 625 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Ky. 1985); Riggs v. United States, 575 F. Supp.
738 (N.D. 111.1983).
41. The requirement that a copy of the petition be given to the summoned party is practical
as well as legal. If the summoned party complies with the summons, there is no case or
controversy and the petition will be dismissed as moot. United States v. Sherlock, 756 F.2d
1145, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sweet, 655 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1981). Moreover,
the summoned party has the right to intervene in the proceeding and will be bound regardless
by any enforcement order. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B) (1982).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B) (1982).
43. Maikranz v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 590 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Franklin v. United
States, 581 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Fogelson v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Kan. 1983); Grisham v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Riggs v. United
States, 575 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. 111.1983).
WINTER 1988
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failure to do so deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and
44
requires dismissal of the petition.
The form of the petition is not specified in the statute. Following rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it should contain a short and
plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction, the facts entitling the
petitioner to relief, and a statement of the relief sought. 45 It is served
upon the United States by personal service upon the U.S. Attorney for
the district in which the suit is brought and by mailing a copy by registered
46
or certified mail to the Attorney General in Washington, D.C.
47
The United States will file a response to the petition and may join
with it a motion for summary enforcement of the summons 48 or a motion
49
to dismiss the petition to quash.
The United States makes a prima facie showing of enforcement of the
summons by submitting the declaration or affidavit of an IRS official
establishing each of the four elements required for a showing that the
summons was issued in good faith. 5 ) The burden then shifts to the peti51
tioner to rebut any of these elements.
Discovery in a summons proceeding "is the exception rather than the
rule." 52 In order to conduct discovery against the United States, the
petitioner must "answer the Government's prima facie case 'through responsive pleadings supported by affidavits, that allege specific facts in

44. Dorsey v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 471 (D. Md. 1985); McTaggart v. United States,
570 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to IRS
summons proceedings has not been consistent. In United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58
n.18 (1964), the Supreme Court said in dictum that Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would require that a complaint and summons be filed in a summons case.
In the later decision of Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528-29 (1970), the Court
relaxed this by stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not to be strictly
applied where to do so might interfere with the summary nature of the summons enforcement
proceeding. Consistent with this, courts have held that no complaint and summons are
required, and that the petition is the proper vehicle for actions to quash or enforce a
summons. United States v. Gajewski, 419 F.2d 1088, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1040 (1970); United States v. Zimmerman, 415 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (W.D. Tex.
1976).
46. FtD. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4).
47. This is the analogue to the answer of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
48. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A) provides that "[in any such proceeding [to quash the
summons], the Secretary may seek to compel compliance with the summons."
49. The motion to dismiss followed the analogy of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
50. The four elements are set forth in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 at 57-58
(1964). and are discussed it/,i'a, in the text accompanying note 59.
51. La Mura v. United States, 765 F.2d 974 (1lth Cir. 1985); United States v. Samuels,
Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526,
536 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).
52. Church of Scientology v. United States, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972).
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rebuttal.' 53 These facts "need only raise 'sufficient doubt' about the
Government's purposes in seeking enforcement of a summons," 54 from
which the court "might infer a possibility of some wrongful conduct by
the Government. ' 55 Summons enforcement proceedings are intended to
is restricted to guarding
be summary in nature. 56 Thus, the court's role
57
against abuses of the IRS's summons power.
IV. Substantive Law of Summons Enforcement
A.

INTRODUCTION

With the general framework of treaty provisions and the summons
power in mind, analysis can turn to the relevant substantive law. Assume,
for example, that an administrative summons has been issued seeking the
records of an American bank. The summons makes reference to a particular foreign state's tax investigation of an individual and cites an article
of a tax convention. Following is an analysis for determining whether that
summons is enforceable. The IRS summons
is not self-enforcing; it must
58
be enforced in a judicial proceeding.
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Powel159 that in order to
enforce an IRS summons the Government must show four things. It must
demonstrate that, "the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, that
the information sought is not already in the Commissioner's possession,
and that all administrative steps required by the Code have been followed." Additionally, a summons may not be issued where a "Justice
Department referral" is in effect. 60 This is defined as a recommendation
by the IRS to the Department of Justice for a grand jury investigation or
61
criminal prosecution of the taxpayer.
As noted, the United States makes a prima facie case for enforcement
of the summons by the submission of the declaration of the IRS agent as

53. Samuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d at 1342, 1347-48, (quoting Kis, 658 F.2d at 539

(7th Cir. 1981)).
54. Satnuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d at 1342, 348, (quoting Church of Scientology, 520

F.2d at 818, 825).
55. Id.

56. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517. 529 (1971).
57. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975); United States v. Powell, 379
U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a); Powell. 379 U.S. at 58, "It is the court's process which is invoked
to enforce the administrative summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused."
59. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
60. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c)(I) (1982).
61. Id. § 7602(c)(2)(A)(i).
WINTER 1988
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to each of the four Powell elements. 6 2 The United States need not show
that the taxpayer is not the subject of a Justice Department referral, 63
but the practice is to include this in the declaration.
The showing of good faith applies to summonses issued at the request
of a foreign state, 64 although the criteria for determining proper purpose
reflect the different function of the summons. No United States tax liability
or investigation is involved; the summons is issued solely in response to
the request of a treaty partner.
B.

PROPER PURPOSE

In the case of a domestic summons, a proper purpose is one set forth
by Congress in statute. 65 In the case of a summons issued pursuant to
the request of a treaty partner, no domestic tax liability or investigation
need be involved. The summons is issued for a proper purpose if it is
issued pursuant to a request by a treaty partner and is within the ambit
of the tax treaty.
In United States v. A. L. Burbank & Co. 66 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of enforcement
of an IRS summons issued pursuant to the request of Canada under the
1942 Canadian Income Tax Treaty. 67 Article XXI of that treaty provided
that in response to a request by Canadian officials, the "Commissioner
may ...furnish ...such information bearing upon the matter as the
Commissioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United
States of America." 68 Although this provision clearly imposed no obligation upon the IRS to obtain the information, the court held that it
62. See supra note 50. A sample declaration was set forth in United States v. Bache
Halsey Stuart, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), discussed infra notes 72-74, and
accompanying text.
63. Pickel v. United States, 746 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d
526, 530, 538-43 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61,68
(3d Cir. 1979); see also S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 183 (1982).
64. United States v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 703 F.2d 47, 52 & n.6 (2d Cir.
1983); Bache Halsey Stuart, 563 F. Supp. at 900; United States v. Alliance Acceptance
Corp., 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9414 (D. Haw. 1987).
65. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (1982); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
66. 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
67. Convention with Respect to Income Taxes, Mar. 4, 1942, United States-Canada, 56
Stat. 1399, amended June 12, 1950, 2 U.S.T. 2235, T.I.A.S. No. 2347, amended Aug. 8,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916, reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H)
22,101
[hereinafter 1942 Canadian Income Tax Treaty].
This treaty has since been superseded by the Convention with Respect to Taxes, United
States-Canada, Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S., amended, Protocol Amending the Convention of
Sept. 26, 1980, June 14, 1983, T.I.A.S., amended, Protocol Amending the Convention of
Sept. 26, 1980, Mar. 28, 1984, T.I.A.S., reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H)
22,030
[hereinafter 1980 Canadian Income Tax Treaty].
68. 1942 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 67, art. XXI provides as follows:
I. If the Minister in the determination of the income tax liability of any person under any of the
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authorized the IRS to use all administrative procedures at its disposal,
including the summons, to gather information, even though no U.S. tax
liability was at stake. 69 This result has been consistently followed. 70

Treaties negotiated since the Burbank decision have made this conclusion unnecessary, for they uniformly require the state receiving a specific
request to use its domestic legal process to obtain information as if its
71
own taxes were in issue.

The IRS makes a prima facie showing for enforcement of the summons
by introducing the declaration or affidavit of an IRS official showing each

element of proper purpose. The burden then shifts to the petitioner to
rebut any of these elements.

In United States v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. 72 the court set forth a
blueprint for the contents of a declaration showing proper purpose. In
Bache Halsey Stuart the court sanctioned the declaration of the Acting
Director of Internal Operations of the IRS, which stated that: (I) he was

the competent authority under the relevant treaty; (2) he had received a
specific request from a treaty partner; (3) he determined the request was
within the ambit of the relevant treaty; (4) the requested information might

be relevant to a determination of the correct foreign tax liability of the
foreign taxpayer; (5) the request was issued in the course of a civil tax
investigation conducted by the treaty partner; and (6) the same type of
information could be obtained by the requesting state under its domestic
law. 73 Similar declarations have been offered with approval in other cases. 74

revenue laws of Canada deems it necessary to secure the cooperation of the Commissioner, the Commissioner may, upon request, furnish the Minister such information bearing upon the matter as the
Commissioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United States of America.
2. If the Commissioner in the determination of the income tax liability of any person under any of
the revenue laws of the United States of America deems it necessary to secure the cooperation of the
Minister, the Minister may, upon request. furnish the Commissioner such information bearing upon the
matter as the Minister is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of Canada.

69. Burbank, 525 F.2d at 16-17.
70. See, e.g., Bache Halsey Stuart. 563 F. Supp. at 900 n. 1.

71. See, e.g.. U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26(3) and OECD Model
Income Tax Treaty, supra note 13, art. 26(3). This provision is incorporated in the 1980
Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 67, the income tax treaties between the United
States and Cyprus, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom, and
the estate and gift tax treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.
See generally Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H).
72. 563 F. Supp. at 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
73. Id. at 900 & n.2.
74. United States v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 703 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Alliance Acceptance Corp., 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9414 (D. Haw.
1987); cj United States v. Lincoln First Bank, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9231 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), infra notes 122-26 and associated text, where the declaration did not specify that
the information sought by the summons could be obtained by the requesting state. See also
Stuart v. United States, 813 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1987) where the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit added a requirement that the declaration show that the requesting state's
domestic tax investigation had not reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department
referral. This ruling is discussed infra notes 152-55 and associated text.
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Analysis of these elements provides a checklist for the United States, and
a plan of attack for the petitioner, in preparing their respective cases.
1. Competent Authority and Delegation
Each treaty provides that official requests for information shall be made
by and acted upon by the respective "competent authorities" of the treaty
partners. 75 The competent authority for the United States is the Secretary
of the Treasury. 76 Authority to exchange information under treaties has
been delegated within the Department of the Treasury to the Internal
77
Revenue Service Assistant Commissioner (Operations).
If someone other than the competent authority or his delegate has acted
in issuing the summons, it arguably lacks the proper authority and may
be invalid. This challenge was presented to the court in Bache Halsey
Stuart and rejected when the court examined the orders delegating authority and determined that the IRS official who acted in issuing the
78
summons was the competent authority.
2. The Request
As set forth above, two elements of the model declaration are that a
request for information has been received from a treaty partner and that
the request is part of a foreign tax investigation. The party attempting to
quash a summons will find these elements difficult to verify or dispute.
This is because the United States treats the request itself as an exchange
of information under the treaty. Treaties routinely provide that any information exchanged is secret, with specified exceptions for disclosure
79
to officials concerned with the assessment or collection of taxes.
In Bache Halsey Stuart the court approved the United States' refusal to
disclose the request, but noted that an in camera inspection of the request
had been conducted. 80 Similarly, in Alliance Acceptance Corp., Inc. v. United
States8 l the court held that disclosure of the official request "is specifically
82
prohibited by Article 25(2) of the [Australian Income Tax] Convention."

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26, paras. I, 3.
See, e.g., Model U.S. Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3(I)(d)(i).
Delegation Order No. 114 (Rev. 6, May 12, 1986).
563 F. Supp. at 901.
See e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, sipra note 9, art. 26(l).
563 F. Supp. at 900 & n.3. The court had before it the Dutch Income Tax Treaty,

snpra note 6. Article XXI provides in pertinent part: "[any information so exchanged shall
be treated as secret and shall not be disclosed to any person other than those concerned
with the assessment and collection of the taxes which are the subject of the present
Convention."
81. 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9414 (D. Haw. 1987).
82. Australian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 7, art. 25(2) provides:
Any inf rnation so exchanged shallhe treated its secret and shallnot be disclosed to any persons other
than those (including aiCourt or administrative body) concerned with the assessment, collection. administration Or enlo cenent o, i with litigalion with respect to. the taxes to which this Convention applies.
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A plausible argument may be made that a request for information is
not an exchange of information under the treaty, and therefore the request
is not covered by the secrecy requirement, because a request for information is by definition not information. The arguments in response are
numerous. First, the term "exchange of information" is broad enough to

contain specific requests for information, and in order to make the request,
information necessarily must be imparted. Second, there is in any event
no exception to the secrecy requirement for exchanges of things other
than "information." Third, there is no provision for disclosure to persons

other than officials concerned with the assessment or collection of taxes. 83

Finally, such disclosure would run counter to the restricted discovery and
the summary nature of the summons proceeding. 84 Thus, a challenge to
a summons on this ground is not likely to succeed.
3. Ambit of the Treaty

In order to determine what information may be the subject of a summons
issued at the request of a treaty partner of the United States, the relevant
treaty must be examined, together with domestic summons law. 85 The
text of the particular treaty is the starting point for such analysis, of
course, and this understanding may be supplemented by the numerous
official commentaries that accompany the treaty during its negotiation and
ratification. 86 Such executive pronouncements are entitled to great weight
in divining the meaning of the treaty language. 8 7
a. Observations on Exchange of Information Provisions
Insofar as a summons is concerned, with certain limited exceptions,8 8

all exchange of information provisions contain three elements. First, the
83. The official commentaries are silent or at best obscure on this point. The Official
Commentary to OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 26 para. 12, 1977 Report of the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, at 186 [hereinafter Official Commentary to OECD Model
Income Tax Treatyl is the only one which mentions this issue. After reiterating the secrecy
provision, it states: -[t]his means that the information may also be communicated to the
taxpayer, his proxy, or the witnesses." This does not explain whether disclosure by the
requested state is contemplated, and in any event makes the disclosure permissive rather
than mandatory by the use of the word may.
84. See supra notes 52-57 and associated text.
85. Burbank, 525 F.2d at 9; Bache Halsey Smart, 563 F. Supp. at 900: United States v.
Lincoln First Bank, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9231, at p. 83,405.
- 86. Such commentaries are routinely provided by the Joint Committee on Taxation, the
Treasury Department, and the Department of State. They are reprinted in Fed. Tax Treaties,
supra note I,after the respective treaty to which they apply.
87. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Burbank, 525 F.2d at 14.
88. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Estate Taxation, July 9, 1951,
United States-Switzerland, art. VII, 3 U.S.T. 3972, T.I.A.S. No. 2533. 165 U.N.T.S. 51,
reprinted in 3 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H)
82,608, which provides only for discretionary
exchanges of information. Such language is similar to that found in the 1942 Canadian Income
Tax Treaty. supra notes 67-68, now superseded, and is in danger of extinction with the
advent of the terms of the U.S. model treaties.
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89
provisions provide that the treaty partners shall exchange information.

The more sophisticated provisions make reference to the states' obligations to honor specific requests for information. 90 Second, they all provide
that the information so exchanged shall be treated as secret, to be disclosed only to persons concerned with the enforcement and collection of
taxes. 91 These provisions evolved from a relatively simple statement of
this rule to an explicit list of the circumstances under which the information may be disclosed. 92 Third, the articles concerning exchange of
information provide exceptions to this obligation in certain circumstances.
These exceptions are generally the same three found in paragraph 2 of
article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, which provides that the
requested state is not obligated to use administrative practices contrary
to the practice of either state, not obligated to exchange information not
obtainable under the laws and administrative practices of either state, and
not obligated to exchange information that would disclose a business or
93
trade secret, or that would be contrary to public policy.
Beyond these similarities, there are significant differences. Treaties
vary in their statement of the purpose for which information may be
exchanged. 94 The purposes for which information may be exchanged are
important because the requesting state typically may use the information

"only for the purposes mentioned in paragraph I" of the exchange of
95
information provision.

89. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9. art. 26(3).
90. See, e.g., id. Similar provisions are contained in the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty,
supra note 13, art. 26(3); Australian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 7,art. 25(4) and 1980
Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 67, art. XVII(2). among others.
91. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26(l).
92. An example of a relatively simple provision is found in the Dutch Income Tax Treaty,
supra note 6. An example of the more complex provision is found in the U.S. Model Income
Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26(l).
93. Such tax treaty provisions are discussed supra notes 100-68 and accompanying text.
94. For example, the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26(l) provides
that the states shall exchange such information "as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes
covered by this Convention insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention." In contrast, the Japanese Income Tax Treaty contains a more limited statement:
the competent authorities "shall exchange such information as is pertinent to carrying out
the provisions of this Convention or preventing fraud or fiscal evasion in relation to the.
taxes which are the subject of this Convention." Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Income Taxation, United States-Japan, Mar. 8, 1971, art. 26, 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No.
7365, reprinted in 2 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 54,056.
95. Official Commentary to OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 83, para. 12,
at 186; Official Commentary to Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts [OECD Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty], art. 12, 1982 Report of the
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, at 127 thereinafter Official Commentary to OECD
Estate and Gift Tax Treatyl.
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Another point of difference is that while some treaties provide that a
state, if specifically requested, must attempt to obtain information in the
form requested by the other state, others contain no such specification.

Article 26(2) of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty contains this requirement and it has been incorporated into the more recent treaties. 96
Treaties also differ in the scope of persons and taxes covered by the

exchange of information provision. Most treaties limit the obligatory exchange of information to persons covered by the treaty, such as nationals,
residents, and persons doing business within the state. However, some
treaties, principally those most recently negotiated, specifically provide

that "[t]he exchange of information is not limited by Article I (General
97
Scope)."

Similarly, the majority of treaties provide for the obligatory exchange
of information concerning only those taxes covered by the treaty. Certain
treaties, however, largely coincident with those providing greater scope
for persons covered, provide obligatory exchange of information relating
to any tax imposed by either state. 98 The narrower scope provisions
concerning the type of taxes covered may prove evanescent in practice,
however, because information regarding a tax not covered by the treaty
might relate to a tax so covered. 99

b. Provisions Relieving a Treaty Partner of the
Obligation to Exchange Information
Every tax convention to which the United States is a party contains a
provision relieving the requested state of its obligation to supply infor-

96. See, e.g., 1980 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 67.
97. This is the language of article 26(l) of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty. Similar
provisions are found in the income tax treaties between the United States and Barbados,
Canada, the People's Republic of China, Denmark, Italy, Jamaica, Malta, and New Zealand,
and in the estate and gift tax treaties between the United States and Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, and Sweden, reprinted in Fed. Tax Treaties, supra note 1. These
provisions are based on Article 26(l) of the U.S. and OECD Model Income Tax Treaties,
supra notes 9 & 13 and Article 12(1) of the Model U.S. and OECD Estate and Gift Tax
Treaties, supra notes 10 & 14.
98. These are the income tax treaties between the United States and Denmark. Egypt
(art. 2(4)). Hungary (art. 1(3)), and Morocco. and in the estate and gift tax treaty between
the United States, Austria and Denmark. See Fed. Tax Treaties, supra note I. These provisions are based on the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, sitpra note 9, art. 26(6).
This appears to be a point of concern for the United States. It filed a reservation to article
26 of the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty stating that it "believes this Article should apply
to all taxes imposed by a Contracting State, not just the taxes covered by the Convention."
See Official Commentary to OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 83, para. 24, at
188.
99. This is discussed, for instance, in the Treasury Department's Technical Explanation
concerning the Australian Income Tax Treaty, which concludes:
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mation. Of particular concern is the language that frees the requested
state from the obligation to "carry out administrative measures at variance
with the laws and administrative practices of that or of the other Contracting State," 100 and from the obligation to "supply information which
is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the adminis0
tration of that or of the other Contracting State."' 1
Regardless of whether a particular treaty places the "nonobligation"
provision ° 2 before' 0 3 or after10 4 the language concerning specific requests, the "nonobligation" provision controls specific requests. This
result obtains because, even where the "nonobligation" provision is placed
after the language concerning specific requests, it governs all exchange
as one
of information under the treaty, and specific requests are 0treated
5
of many contemplated varieties of information exchange.'
The initial question is how these clauses are intended to relate to the
requesting state and the requested state, respectively, in making the calculation under paragraph 2. For the requesting state, the proper inquiry
is whether the information could be obtained by that state from a source
within its borders in a purely domestic proceeding. 106 On the other hand,
the requested state, in making the determination under paragraph 2, is to
act as if it were obtaining information for its own domestic tax investigation, treating the requesting state's tax as its own.10 7 Although the

[tlhe information furnished could relate to a tax not covered by the Convention if it is relevant to
enforcing a tax which is so covered. For example. it is possible that information relating to sales taxes
or estate taxes could be needed to verify an item of income or expense for income tax purposes.

I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1 15,062, at 15,070.
6
100. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2 (2)(a).
101. See, e.g., id. art. 26(2)(b). This stipulation appears to apply principally to situations
where the requested state already has the information in its possession, and therefore need
not resort to compulsory process to obtain it. Note, sipra note 15. at 152 n. 37. It is not
completely clear, however, that paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) are mutually exclusive. For example, the requested state's administrative practices may contemplate the use ofa particular
vehicle to compel general information, but may prohibit the compulsion of a particular type
of information. In that situation, although paragraph 2(a) would not come into play, paragraph
2(b) would be triggered. Since that is the case, both paragraphs are considered here.
102. This provision will be referred to as the "nonobligation provision" or as "paragraph
2" (its location in the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty). It has also been referred to in terms
of "reciprocity" and has been called the "least" or "lowest common denominator provision" because its effect "is to reduce the obligatory exchange of information to the 'least
common denominator' between the respective states' authority to compel the information."
Switzer, supra note 5. at 310; see also, Note, sopra note 15.
103. See. e.g., 1980 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 67.
104. See, e.g., Australian Income Tax Treaty. supra note 7.
105. See sources cited supra note 5.
106. See Note, supra note 15. "The test would be whether the information sought was
of a type the requesting nation could obtain itself if the information were located within the
requesting nation." Id. at 165. See also sources cited infra. notes 107, 110, 121, 127.
107. The language of certain treaties makes this express. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income
'lax Treaty, supra note 9, para. 3. See also, 1980 Canadian Income Tax Treaty. su/pra note
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requested state is usually affirmatively obligated to use all domestic process at its disposal to honor a specific request, 1 8 it is not obligated to
resort to administrative measures not available where its own tax matters
are concerned. 109
In cases where paragraph 2 is triggered, the exchange of information
is discretionary rather than obligatory. However, such discretionary exchanges are contemplated by the treaty. It0 Once the respective powers
of the two states are determined, the next question is under what circumstances the exchange of information is obligatory or discretionary, and if
discretionary, under what circumstances information should be exchanged.
67, art. XXVII(2) which provides:
[itf information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article. the other Contracting
State shall endeavor to obtain the information to which the request relates in the same way as if its own
taxation was involved notwithstanding the fact that the other State does not. at the time. need such
information.

Similar language appears in the official commentaries to treaties. For example, the Treasury
Department's Technical Explanation to the U.S.-Icelandic Income Tax Treaty, reprinted in
2 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 146,000, at 46,001 provides as follows:
In making the determinations necessary under paragraph (2)a Contracting State requested to furnish
information will use the standard it uses in the enforcement of its own laws by its administrative and
judicial authorities, treating the tax of the Contracting State with respect to which the request relates
as if it were a tax of the Contracting State requested to furnish the information and were being imposed
by such Contracting State.

The Treasury Department's Technical Explanation of the Japanese Income Tax Treaty,
reprinted in 2 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 54,066, at 54,088, and of the Norwegian Income
Tax Treaty, reprinted in 3 id. 69,068, at 69,062, state the same propositions.
108. See, e.g., Explanation of the Australian Income Tax Treaty prepared by the Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1115,064, at
15,100-F, which states:
[tlhe
proposed treaty provides that a requested country will try to obtain the information requested the
same way as if its own taxation was involved, notwithstanding the fact that the requested country does
not, at that time, need the information. What this means is that a requested country will use its subpoena
or summons power or any other powers that it has under its own laws to collect information requested
by the other country, even though it itself does not need that information for its own purposes.

109. "A country is not required to carry out administrative measures at variance with its
laws or which it cannot obtain in the normal course of administration .. " Explanation of
the Joint Committee on Taxation to the 1980 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, reprinted in I
Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 1 22,070, at 22, 100-Z.38. See also Official Commentary to OECD
Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 83, para. 14, at 187 ("[A] Contracting State is not
bound to go beyond its internal laws and administrative practice in putting information at
the disposal of the other Contracting State."). Such language is included as a matter of
course in the official commentaries to U.S. treaties.
110. The Official Commentary to the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty supra note 83,
para. 17, at 187, states:
ltlhe requested State is at liberty to refuse to give information in the cases referred to in the paragraphs
above. However. ifit does give the requested information, it remains within the framework of the
agreement on the exchange of information which is laid down in the Convention; consequently it cannot
be objected that this State has failed to observe the obligation to secrecy.

This same expression is found in the Official Commentary to the OECD Estate and Gift
Tax Treaty, supra note 95, para. 15, at 128. See also the Treasury Department's Technical
Explanation of the 1980 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, reprinted in I Fed. Tax Treaties, (P-

H)

22,065, at 22,100B.4, which states:
[tihus. Article XXVII allows, but does notobligate, the United States and Canada to obtain and provide
information that would not be available to the requesting State tinder its laws or administrative practices
orthat in differet circumstances would notbe available to the State requested U provide the information.
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Four possible situations result from the calculation under paragraph 2,
formed by the various combinations of whether the requesting state and
the requested state have the ability under their respective domestic practices to compel the information. The information may be obtainable by
both states, neither state, or one but not the other.
In the case in which the information is obtainable by neither state, no
exchange of information will take place. The requested state will refuse
to obtain information unavailable to it in a domestic investigation"'I and
may also refuse to obtain information that the requesting state could not
itself compel.' 1 2 In the unlikely event such a summons was issued, enforcement would be refused.
The second case is that in which the information is obtainable under
the domestic law and practices of both states. In this case, paragraph 2
is never triggered and the exchange of information is obligatory. The
requested state must use its domestic summons power as if its own taxes
were in issue to obtain the information.' 13
This was the situation presented in Bache Halsey Stuart,' 14 in which
the summons was ordered enforced, although the court did not linger over
the treaty provisions in so holding. The United States sought to enforce
a summons issued at the request of Dutch tax authorities pursuant to the
relevant convention.' 15 The United States introduced the affidavit of the
competent authority to show, inter alia, that the Netherlands was conducting a civil tax investigation and that the same type of information
could be obtained by the Dutch authorities. 116
The court correctly ruled that the affidavit's statement that the information could be obtained under the Convention established a prima facie
case for this element of Powell. 117 Had the petitioner challenged this, the
court would have examined articles XXI and XXIII of the Convention,
which are very similar to paragraphs I, 2, and 3 of Article 26 of the Model
U.S. Income Tax Treaty.' ' 8 Had the court done so, it would have found

I lI.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
(1964),
one of
118.

See sources cited supra note 109.
See sources cited infra notes 119-39.
See sources cited supra note 107.
United States v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Dutch Income Tax Treaty, supra note 6.
This affidavit is discussed supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
Bache Halsey Stuart, 563 F. Supp. at 900. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48
articulates four requisites for a showing that an IRS summons is issued in good faith,
which is that it was issued for a proper purpose.
Article XXI paraphrases Article 26(l) of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, see

supra note 9 and text accompanying note 16. Article XXIII(I) contains the provisions of
Paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) of Article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, id., and Article
XXIII(2) contains a specific request provision.
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that both the requesting state and the requested state could obtain the
information. This finding would have led the court to enforce the summons
because the United States was obligated to comply with the request.

A third case is that in which the requesting state cannot obtain the
information under its own laws but the requested state can under its laws.
Because paragraph 2 is triggered,' 1 9 the requested state is not obligated
to honor the request, although it clearly has the authority to do so. 120
Whether the summons should be enforced if the requested state could
not itself obtain the requested information is not settled. The commentary
to the OECD model treaties specifically provides that "a Contracting State
cannot take advantage of the information system of the other Contracting

State if it is wider than its own system."' 12' The only reported U.S. case
on the issue, United States v. Lincoln First Bank, 122 held that an IRS

summons would not be enforced absent a showing by the United States
that the requesting state could obtain the information under its domestic

procedures. In Lincoln First Bank the United States sought to enforce a
summons issued at the request of the Norwegian Tax Directorate pursuant
to Article 28 of the Norwegian Income Tax Treaty. 123 The Norwegian
24
authorities were conducting both a civil and a criminal tax investigation. 1

The declaration offered by the United States was silent on whether the

119. Paragraph 2(a) and 2(b) of Article 26, U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra text
accompanying note 16, are triggered where the summons would entail "administrative
measures at variance with the laws and administrative practices" of the requesting state,
or would result in obtaining information "not obtainable under the laws or in the normal
course of administration" of the requesting state, respectively.
120. See sources cited supra note 110.
121. Both Official Commentary to OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 83, para.
16, at 187 and Official Commentary to OECD Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, supra note
95, para. 13, at 128, contain this language:
Furthermore, the requested State does not need to go so far as to carry out administrative measures
that are not permitted under the law or practice of the requesting State or to supply items of information
that are not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of administration of the requesting State.
It follows that a State cannot take advantage of an information system wider than its own system.

122. 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9231 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
123. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Income Taxation, United States-Norway,
supra note 7. Article 28 governs the exchange of information. Paragraph (2)(a) is substantially
the same as paragraph 2(a) of Model U.S. Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26. See 3
Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 91
69,058, at 69,049-50.
124. The case presents two issues. The first is whether an IRS summons should be
enforced where it is issued at the request of a foreign state without a showing that that
foreign state could obtain the information. The second issue, not reached by the court, is
whether an IRS summons should be enforced where the IRS arguably could not obtain the
information itself because of the criminal nature of the foreign tax investigation. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7602(c) (1982) prohibits the issuance of an IRS summons after a recommendation by the
IRS to the Department of Justice for criminal proceedings, supra notes 60 and 61. This
second issue was reached in Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. United States, 703 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1983) and in United States v. Stuart, 813 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1987), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 144-62.
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information was obtainable under Norwegian law, and on this basis the
court denied enforcement of the summons, citing the official commentary
25
to the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty.1
The holding of Lincoln First Bank is thus that a treaty summons should
not be enforced where it would provide information outside the scope
contemplated by the particular treaty. 126 It is not apparent that such a
summons should be quashed in every case. Specifically, the commentaries
to later U.S. treaties part ways with their OECD counterparts on this
issue. Although the commentaries to U.S. treaties clearly make information exchange nonobligatory in this circumstance, they equally as clearly
expect the information to be exchanged.' 27 Commentaries to the U.S.
treaties, rather than the OECD commentaries, guide the interpretation of
U.S. tax treaties. 128
More generally, there are several reasons why the requested state might
honor the request. First, to do so does not offend any domestic law; the
requested state would simply follow its standard procedures for compelling information. 129 Second, refusing enforcement of the summons serves
no purpose. No domestic interest is furthered because there is no domestic
tax or U.S. taxpayer. No other policy is served because the foreign nationals affected have no expectation that any rights they may have under
125. Lincoln FirstBatk, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

9231 (citing United States v. A. L. Burbank

& Co., 525 F.2d 9, 16 n.6 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976)). The OECD
Model Income Tax Commentary is set forth supra note 121.
126. The court's holding that a summons would not be enforced where it was a nonobligatory exchange of information is not germane to the holding and is incorrect. See Note.
supra note 15, at 160.
127. See, e.g., Explanation of the Australian Income Tax Treaty prepared by the Staff

of the Joint Committee on Taxation, May 23. 1983, supra note 108, 115,064, at 15,100-G:
A requested country is to use its subpoena or summons power or any othet powers it has under itsown
law to collect information requested by the other country. Itis intended that the requested country may
usethose powers even ifthe requested country could not ttnder its own laws. Thus. itis not intended
that the provision be strictly reciprocal. For example. once the U.S. Internal Revenue Service has
referred a case to the Justice )epartment for possible criminal prosecution, the U.S. investigators can
no longer use an administrative sttmmons to obtain inlormation. If,however. Aiistralia could still use
administrative process to obtain requested inlormation. it would he e.xpected to do so even though the
United States cannot. The United States cotild not, however, tell Australia which of its procedures to
use [emphasis addedl.

Similar language routinely appears in the official U.S. commentaries to the more recent
treaties. See, e.g., Explanation of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the 1980 Canadian
Income Tax Treaty, sutpra note 109, 122.070.
128. Lincoln First Bank, 80-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. at 119231, relied on the OECD commentary

in part because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Burbank, 525 F.2d at
16 n.6, relied on it, and in part because it found the Norwegian Income Tax Treaty "was
apparently patterned"

on the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at

83,4)5. Where the official commentary to a particular treaty conflicts with the OECD commentary, the former would control because the OECD commentary specifically provides
this. supra note 95, at 5, and because it reflects the understanding of this particular treaty.
rather than the consensus of the pluralistic chorus that resulted in the OECD model. For a

discussion of the perceived weaknesses in this consensus commentary, see Switzer, supra
note 5, at 311.
129. See Switzer, supra note 5. at 310.
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their law will be applied in this context. By transacting business in the
United States, foreign nationals have subjected themselves to U.S. law.

The foreign taxpayer is always free to use his domestic law to exclude
the information in a resulting proceeding in the requesting state. Third,
to refuse to enforce the summons might well impair relations with the
requesting state, since it involves a court's determination that a foreign
state's law forbids its own request.1 3° Fourth, and finally, the refusal to
provide the information arguably does violence to the intent of the treaty,
which is to exchange information. The prevention of fraud and fiscal

evasion through information exchange will be hampered if the "lowest
common denominator" sets the outer rather than the inner limits of in-

formation exchange. 131 The fact that the requested state is not obligated
to provide the information is unrelated to this question; the authority to

summon exists because the requested state is granted the discretion under
the treaty to use its domestic process to respond to the request.

132

A decision on whether a summons should be enforced in this context
involves two determinations, which should not be confused. The first is

the executive's decision to honor a treaty partner's request and issue the
summons. Paragraph 2 grants it this discretionary authority. 133 The second
is the judicial determination to enforce the summons. A summons is otherwise enforceable if it is issued for a proper purpose. 134 The proper
purpose of a treaty summons is determined by reference to the language
of the applicable treaty and the official commentaries. The ultimate question is whether the treaty contemplates that the requested state will pro130. This point was raised in United States v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 703
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1983), discussed infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text. Before the
court was the issue of whether the summons should be enforced where the requesting state
could obtain the information but the requested state could not if its own taxes were in issue.
The situations are closely related and the observation has merit in this application as well.
Lincoln First Bank itself provides an illustration ofjudicial foreign policy making. " Under
the treaty, the United States is not obligated to and, in the opinion of this Court, should
not take measures which are inconsistent with Norwegian law in an effort to comply with
the request for information." 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,405. The court then rejected the
United States' argument that the treaty's "reciprocity" provision stipulated a floor rather
than a ceiling for information exchange: "The Court does not find this unsupported argument
persuasive. The governmental agencies of the United States should not be employed to
provide information to a foreign country which could not be obtained under the laws of the
country." Id. at 83,405. Another example is presented in United States v. Stuart. 813 F.2d
243 (9th Cir. 1987), sutpra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
131. Switzer. supra note 5, at 310.
132. In the purely domestic context, the IRS is not required to issue a summons: that it
has discretion to do so answers the question of authority. In the context of treaty summonses,
Burbank, 525 F.2d at 9. found the authority to issue and enforce a summons where the
treaty provided only for discretionary exchanges of information.
133. The authority to issue a summons pursuant to a treaty request was recognized in
Burbank, id.
134. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 51. 57-58 (1964); see supra text accompanying
note 59.
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vide information obtainable to it but unavailable to the requesting state
under its domestic law. In most cases the treaty simply provides that the
states may provide the information. 3 5 Resort must then be made to the
official commentary. If it indicates that the summons would provide information beyond that contemplated by the treaty, 136 then the treaty should
not be enforced. If it indicates that the exchange of information is anticipated, 137 however, then the summons should be enforced. Divining the
treaty's intent may be difficult, but it is the court's customary function.
The analysis of proper purpose and treaty ambit should be made with an
appreciation of the summary nature of the summons proceeding 38 and
the court's role where the executive's conduct of foreign affairs is

concerned.

139

The fourth possible situation is the one that has generated the most
judicial controversy: the requesting state may obtain the information, but
the requested state would not be able to if the taxes at issue were its own.
Because paragraph 2 comes into play, any information exchange is discretionary rather than obligatory. The official commentary to many U.S.
tax treaties accordingly contains language that the requested state is expected, but not required, to obtain the information. 140 A requested state,
however, is not obligated to use means other than those used in connection
with its domestic taxes in responding to a treaty request.' 4' The current
split between the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second and Ninth Circuits
provides an illustration of the problems that arise here.
In both United States v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. 14 2 and
United States v. Stuart 43 the question was whether a summons should
be enforced when it was issued at the request of Canadian tax authorities
conducting both civil and criminal tax investigations of a Canadian taxpayer. In both cases, it was shown that Canada could obtain the information under its domestic administrative procedures. The Second Circuit
135. See, e.g., art. 26(2) of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 16 and
associated text. Certain early treaties. however, contain a provision in the text that exchanges of information will be "subject to reciprocity." See, e.g., Convention for the Avoid-

ance of Double Estate Taxation, June 13, 1949, United States-Norway art. VII, 2 U.S.T.
2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358, 127 U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 3 Fed. Tax Treaties (P-H) 69,601.
136. E.g., Official Commentary to the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 83.
137. See, e.g., Treasury Department's Technical Explanation to the 1980 Canadian In-

come Tax Treaty. supra note 110.
138. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
139. Courts have repeatedly held that the judicial branch should not impinge on the

political prerogatives of the government in the sensitive area of foreign relations. See Chicago
& S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) and its progeny.

140. See sources cited supra note 127.
141. See supra note 109.

142. 703 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1983).
143. 813 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1987).
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enforced the summons in Manufacturers & Traders Trust but the Ninth

Circuit refused to do so in Stuart, absent a showing that the Canadian
criminal tax investigation had not reached a stage analogous to Justice
Department referral.
In enforcing the summons, the Manufacturers & Traders Trust court

looked at the relevant provision, article XXI of the 1942 U.S.-Canada
Income Tax Treaty.1 4 That article grants the IRS authority to issue 45a
summons if Canada requests it pursuant to a civil tax investigation.
Since a civil tax investigation was being conducted,
the court reasoned
46
that the summons was otherwise enforceable.1
The court next considered the question of whether the IRS's inability
to issue a summons when the information would be used for a domestic
criminal investigation should prevent it from doing so when compliance
was necessary under the treaty to aid Canada, which could obtain the
information. When the issue was decided, Section 7602(c) was not yet in
effect, but the Supreme Court's ruling in UnitedStates v. LaSalle National
Bank 47 prevented the IRS from issuing a summons to aid a criminal

prosecution. The change enacted by Section 7602(c) makes no difference
48
to the court's analysis.
The court looked at the reasons for the domestic prohibition, found
them to be wholly internal, and therefore inapplicable to Canada and to
a summons issued in this context. It reasoned further that application of
domestic policy in these circumstances not only would not achieve its
purpose, but might damage U.S.-Canadian relations. 14 9 The court concluded that the relevant treaty phrase, "such information ...

as the

Commissioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United
States of America" ' 50 did not contain the full judicial gloss governing IRS
summonses issued for a domestic tax investigation. 15 1 Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed the district court and ordered the summons
enforced.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Stuart, interpreting
a summons issued under the same treaty in the same circumstances,

144. See supra note 68.

145. This is the same treaty provision at issue in Burbank, discussed supra notes 65-70
and accompanying text.
146. 703 F.2d at 50.
147. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
148. The language of 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c) (1982) is discussed supra text accompanying

notes 60, 61.
149. 703 F.2d at 53.

150. 1942 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 68, art. XXI.
151. 703 F.2d at 51.
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reached the opposite result. It engrafted the requirement of Section 7602(c)
to any summons, regardless of purpose, and ruled that the summons could
not be enforced without an affidavit containing an affirmative statement
that the investigation has not reached a "stage analogous to Justice Department referral." 152
Stuart attempted to distinguish Manufacturers & Traders Trust by noting it was decided before the enactment of Section 7602(c) and therefore
the Manufacturers & Traders Trust court was required to examine the
institutional good faith of Revenue Canada, an agency of a foreign
country. 53 The Ninth Circuit sympathized with the Second Circuit's reluctance to undertake this task, and noted that Section 7602(c) now made
this inquiry unnecessary. 54 Stuart thus avoided any analysis of the relevant treaty provision, the purpose for which the summons was issued,
and whether statutes with a wholly domestic purpose and application
should be applied in an international context. These were the subject of
55
Judge Wright's dissent.'
The decision in Stuart is incorrect, and Manuficturers & Traders Trust
provides a better model for analysis of the problem. The ultimate question
before both courts was whether the summons was issued in good faith,
and more particularly, whether the summons was issued for a proper
purpose. Since Canada could obtain the information under its law, the
request was made in good faith. Similarly, since the request met the
requirements of the treaty and did not trespass on domestic law or procedures, the summons was issued in good faith and for a proper purpose.
Although both Manufacturers Bank and Stuart were decided under a
treaty provision that has not been perpetuated in subsequent conventions, 156 the provision in issue made the exchange of information discretionary. This is the same result that would obtain under treaties based on
the model treaties, because the "nonobligation" provision of Article
26(2)(a) is triggered. 157 That does not end the analysis, however, for dis158
cretionary exchanges of information are contemplated by the treaty.

152. Stuart v. United States, 813 F.2d 243, 249 (9th Cir. 1987). Note that this adds a
requirement to the contents of the declaration offered to show good faith; cjf United States
v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 898, 9008 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
153. 813 F.2d at 249.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 251-53.
156. The provision in the 1942 Canadian Income Tax Treaty, supra note 67, contemplates
only discretionary exchanges; there is nothing comparable to the obligatory exchange and
relief therefrom contemplated by the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26,
paras. I, 2.
157. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 16, art. 26.
158. See supra note 110.
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Further, a major purpose of the treaty is to foster the exchange of information; where possible, the treaty should be liberally construed to effect
59
its purpose. 1
The next question the court should ask is what domestic provision
makes the information unavailable to the requested state. If it is the administrative inability to obtain the information, such as the case where
the state simply has no vehicle to obtain the information, then the summons cannot be enforced. 160
When the reason the requested state cannot obtain the information rests
on policy considerations, however, the court should carefully examine
the reasons for the policy and the interests and parties served by its
application to the special case presented by a summons issued at the
request of a treaty partner. This examination should take place in the
context of the desire to honor the request of a foreign sovereign under
an agreement entered into with the United States.' 6 1 While this proposed
analysis is tipped in favor of enforcement of the summons, that action is
by no means automatic. Further, even if the requested state could obtain
the information, it might nevertheless decline to enforce the summons on
the broad grounds of "public policy," contained in all tax treaties. 162 This
analysis focuses on the correct question of whether the summons is issued
for a purpose proper under the relevant treaty.
C.

THE SUMMONS MUST SEEK INFORMATION THAT MAY
BE RELEVANT

A second requirement of any IRS summons is that it seeks information
that "may be relevant to the investigation." 163 The standard of relevance
required of an internal revenue summons is slight. Information is relevant
if it "might throw light upon the correctness of the taxpayer's return." 164
159. United States v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 934 (1976) (citing Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940)).
160. The official commentaries to a number of treaties indicate that a requested state is
not bound to go beyond its own administrative practices in honoring the request of a foreign
state. See supra note 109 and associated text. A further example is provided in Official
Commentary to the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 83, para. 18, at 187, and
the Official Commentary to the OECD Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, supra note 95,
para. 16. at 129, which reads -[i]f the structure of the information systems of the two
Contracting States is very different, the conditions under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
Paragraph 2 will lead to the result that the Contracting States exchange very little information."
161. See supra note 139.
162. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 9, art. 26(2)(c).
163. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
164. La Mura v. United States, 765 F.2d 974, 981 (1 Ith Cir. 1981): see also Matter of
Newton. 718 F.2d 1015 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); United States v.
City NatI' Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d
728, 733 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
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For example, information concerning bank accounts may be relevant where
it may "flush out" related accounts. 165 There must, however, be a realistic
expectation rather than an idle hope that something will turn up. 166
This low threshold of relevance, together with the inability to examine
the request of the foreign state which prompts the issuance of the summons, 167 make challenge of the summons on this ground extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it may be possible for the taxpayer to challenge
disclosure of some or all of the records by arguing that their subject matter
of the investigation or that they are too remote
is irrelevant to the scope
68
relevant.'
be
to
in time
D.

THE INFORMATION

Is

NOT IN THE GOVERNMENT'S POSSESSION

The third requirement of an IRS administrative summons is that it not
seek information already in the Government's possession. 169 This requirement prohibits the IRS from summoning the same records more than
once from the same party. The purpose of the rule is to prevent unnecessary or harassing summonses. 170 The requirement does not prevent the
IRS from summoning the taxpayer's records and then summoning his
bank's copies of the same records, because this is viewed as necessary
in verifying information 17 1 and helpful in finding related bank accounts. 172
If the summoned party complies with the summons prematurely and
delivers the summoned documents to the IRS before the time for filing
the petition to quash has run, or while that proceeding is pending, the
summoned records are not considered as already in the U.S. possession.
Rather, the petition to quash is moot unless the United States agrees to
keep the records under seal pending the court's determination of the
petition. 173
165. United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 458 (2d Cir. 1979), (cited by United
States v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
166. La Mura, 765 F.2d at 974, 981; Newton, 718 F.2d at 1015, 1019-20; Harrington. 388

F.2d at 520. 524.
167. See supra notes 79-84.
168. For iistance, in La Mura examination of records concerning tax years preceding
the years under investigation was relevant because the IRS wanted to know whether the
taxpayers had actually made claimed charitable contributions of one-third of their income.
Records for the previous years were held to be relevant to determine whether parting with
so much income changed the taxpayers' mode of living. Such a situation will not be presented
in every case.
169. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
170. United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 538 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Carr, 585
F. Supp. 863, 867 (E.D. La. 1981).
171. Liberty Fin. Services v. United States, 778 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 458 (2d Cir. 1979).
173. Cf. supra note 41. This situation was presented in Alliance Acceptance Corp. v.
United States, 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9414 (D. Haw. 1987), where the court ruled the
information was not in the possession of the government.
VOL. 22, NO. 4

IRS THIRD-PARTY RECORDKEEPER SUMMONSES

E.

ALL ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS

Now

1015

IN COMPLIANCE

Finally, the summons will be enforced only if the IRS has adhered to
all administrative steps required for its issuance. 174 This element of Powell
is usually set forth in the declaration of the IRS agent who issued the
summons.
There are certain exceptions to this requirement. If notice of the summons is not properly provided, but the petition to quash is timely filed,
the summons will not be quashed for that reason, because there has been
no prejudice. 175 Further, if the IRS violates an administrative step in the
issuance of the summons and this violation could prejudice its ability to
enforce the summons, the summons will be withdrawn and a new one
issued that corrects any error in the earlier summons. The petition is moot
once the summons is withdrawn, 176 and a new one will have to be filed
in response to the second summons.
V. Conclusion

The foregoing discussion makes it apparent that the procedural and
substantive law governing an IRS administrative summons issued pursuant to a treaty partner's request is substantially the same as its domestic
counterpart. The significant point of departure is the analysis of whether
the summons has been issued for a proper purpose.
In the case of a treaty summons, the statutory purposes of a domestic
summons are supplanted by the applicable treaty. Examination must then
be made of the treaty provisions and their official and judicial interpretations. In cases in which the exchange of information provision is based
upon the U.S. or OECD model treaties, the pertinent questions are whether
this type of information is to be exchanged under the treaty, whether the
requesting state could obtain the information, whether the respective competent authorities have determined that the United States should honor
the request, and whether the IRS could summon the information if a purely
domestic tax investigation were being conducted, ignoring purely domestic policy concerns. If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, then the summons should be enforced.
In other respects, the summons must meet the Powell requirements for
the enforcement of any IRS summons. The procedure for quashing or
enforcing the treaty summons is identical to the summons issued for a
domestic tax investigation.
174. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964). The administrative steps required
for the issuance of an IRS administrative summons are set forth supra notes 23-37 and
accompanying text.
175. Vincent v. United States, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9133 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Rivera
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9371 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
176. Kearns v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 8, 20 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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